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NOTES
NLRB CONTROL AND ADMINISTRATION OF
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS
The right given employees under the Labor Management Relations
Act to exercise freedom of choice in selecting a union to represent them
in the collective bargaining process' must be balanced against the need for
stability in labor-management relations. In the administration of the
representative process the National Labor Relations Board' must seek to
facilitate bargaining between employer and union. The NLRB has been
assigned a difficult task and the methods used to achieve the desired
goals should be examined in order to appraise the Board's functioning.
Choice of a Representative
The first step in the approach to collective bargaining is the deter-
mination of the representative for the laborers. Where one union is the
clear choice of the workers, an employer's refusal to bargain is an unfair
labor practice.4 The Act provides that an employer can demand an elec-
tion only when a reasonable doubt of the union's majority exists.5 Before
the Board will direct a representation election certain jurisdictional facts
must be determined. It must be established that there is a doubt as to the
representative, that the employer is engaged in interstate commerce, and
that there has not been a prior conclusive determination of an employee
representative.6 The union that is chosen becomes the ". . . exclusive
1. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 136 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952). The further reference to sections shall be reference to sections
of the Labor Management Relations Act.
2. Section 7 of the Act gives the employees the right to choose a representative.
This includes the right to decide against unionization.
3. The National Labor Relations Board will be hereafter referred to as the "Board"
or the "NLRB."
4. Wilson & Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 959 (1948).
A union does not have to file an unfair labor practice charge against an employer
in order to seek an election after the employer's refusal to recognize a union majority.
It has been indicated that: "The Board does not, in representation proceedings, inquire
into the bona fides of the employer's doubt as to majority, inasmuch as the union has
elected to have its majority status determined in a representation proceeding rather than
by filing charges of refusal to bargain." 8 NLRB ANN. REP. 44 n.2 (1943).
5. See Section 9(c) (1) (B) of the Act.
6. The Board will generally not accept a petition from a group of employees or
union if the bargaining unit is currently operating under a valid, written contract. This
has been designated as a "Contract Bar." A petition filed after the execution of a
contract between the employer and union "A," but before the effective date of the con-
tract, is timely since a contract may not be made effective retroactively for contract bar
purposes. Stewart & Nuss, Inc., 97 N.L.R.B. 1250 (1952). The Board will accept a peti-
tion even if filed just prior to the automatic renewal date of an existing contract. Inter-
national Harvester Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 242 (1948) ; DeSoto Creamery & Produce Co., 94
N.L.R.B. 1627 (1951). Contracts terminable at will or of an indefinite duration will bar
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representatives of all employees in such unit. . . . "' It then becomes the
union's duty to act under the guidance of its members for the benefit of
all employees, aid it is incumbent on the employer to bargain with the
certified union.
With a view toward achieving voluntary labor-management rela-
tions, the Act provides that those desiring to file a petition for represen-
tation must indicate that the ". . . employer declines to recognize their
representative.. "8 The NLRB presently refuses to impose this
statutory requirement9 contending that it is not jurisdictional because no
union, currently recognized but not certified, could honestly allege in its
petition that an employer declined recognition.1" Such an argument
hardly justifies ignoring the statutory provision, and it may be questioned
whether this decision enhances voluntary relations between employer and
employees. Assuming an employer were willing to recognize the union
through voluntary agreement, he would undoubtedly become antagonistic
toward a union that by-passed him and filed a petition with the NLRB.
This practice of the Board will tend to obstruct voluntary recognition and
may be instrumental in forcing the election machinery to go the full dis-
tance. The Board has thus refused to follow a statutory procedure
which could result in voluntary recognition, or which might, at least,
shorten the election procedure possibly through the means of a consent
election.1
an election for a two year period. Rohm & Haas Co., 108 N.L.R.B. No. 185 (June 10,
1954). A contract not reduced to writing will not bar a petition. Elliott Co., 106
N.L.R.B. No. 155 (Aug. 26, 1953). When there is a merger of the employer's operation
with another company the contract is not a bar, for the employees in the reconstituted
unit should be allowed a voice in determining a representative. L. B. Spear & Co., 106
N.L.R.B. No. 118 (Aug. 11, 1953).
For a good discussion on the contract bar see Lahne, The Duration of Labor Agree-
ients and the Contract Bar Doctrine of the National Labor Relations Board, 5 SvRACUSE
L. REv. 146 (1954).
7. See Section 9(a) of the Act.
8. The following language is used in Section 9: "(c) (1) Whenever a petition shall
have been filed, in accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Board-
"(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organization
acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of employees (i) wish to be
represented for collective bargaining and that their employer declines to recognige their
representative as the representative defined in subsection (a) of this section. (em-
phasis added).
9. Advance Pattern Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 29 (1948); see J. I. Case, 87 N.L.R.B. 692
(1949).
10. Advance Pattern Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 29, 33 (1948).
Member Murdock pointed out in his dissent from the decision that "... unless a
request for recognition is made of the employer prior to filing a petition, he has not been
given a reasonable opportunity to acquiesce in bargaining on a voluntary basis." Id. at 40.
11. A consent election is one in which all phases of recognition have been agreed
upon. The parties to the election have agreed on the voter eligibility, the time, place, and
date of the election, and the appropriate unit. Therefore, a hearing is waived. See dis-
cussion p. 179 infra.
NOTES
The election process must not be initiated by frivolous petitions for
recognition since to allow such practice would unnecessarily burden the
election machinery. Consequently, to commence the process a petition
claiming at least thirty percent employee support must be filed with the
Board. 2 Evidence of this support usually consisting of cards which have
authorized the union as the employee representative must be filed within
forty-eight hours of the petition. 3 Such employee authorization must
have been received without misrepresentation.' 4 Subsequently, a pre-
liminary investigation is conducted in which the Board's investigator
checks the company payroll against the evidence of employee backing. 5
This administrative determination initiates the overall program designed
to protect the employees' right to choose their representative. To allow
elections under circumstances where there is no interest showing would be
greatly unjust to both employers and employees. Once the thirty percent
interest has been determined there can be no attack on the evidence at
the hearing " since this is not a jurisdictional determination. 7 If this
The Board has withheld its facilities from unions that fail to comply with the other
filing requirements of Section 9 pertaining to union organization, financial statements,
and non-communist affidavits. Section 9(f) (g) (h). See also Standard Oil Co., 101
N.L.R.B. 1329 (1952). Noncompliance in these instances appears the same as the
union's failure to allege nonrecognition by the employer.
12. Section 9 (c) (1) (A) provides that those seeking representation must allege
that a substantial number of employees desire representation. By administrative practice
the Board has required a thirty percent interest showing. 29 CODE FED. REGS. § 101.17
(1949).
13. 29 CODE FED. RIGS. § 101.16 (1949). Other evidence of interest may consist of
membership or application for membership in the union, Cudahy Packing Co., 65
N.L.R.B. 10 (1945) ; and of dues receipts by the union. Simmons Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 984
(1946).
14. American Potash & Chemical Corp., NLRB Administrative Decision. Case N.
21-RC-3010. July 20, 1953. Here, at the time the signatures of employees supporting
the union were solicited, a leaflet was also distributed stating that the only purpose was
to find out the number who wished unionization and not how many employees wanted to
accept membership in this particular union. The Board declared that this was mis-
representation and no indication that the union was authorized by a substantial number
of employees.
15. The regulation provides that the examiner ... conducts an investigation to
ascertain (1) whether the employer's operations affect commerce . . . (2) the appro-
priateness of the unit . . . and the existence of a . . . question concerning representa-
tion . . . (3) whether the election would effectuate the policies of the act . . . [and] (4)
[if] . . . there is . . . evidence . . . employees have selected [the union] to represent
them." 29 CODE FED. REGS. § 101.17 (1949). As the rules further indicate: "The evi-
dence of representation . . . is checked to determine the number or proportion of em-
ployees who have designated the petitioner. . . ." Ibid.
16. Liberty Cork Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 372 (1951). "We have repeatedly pointed out
that such reports are administrative expedients only, adopted to enable the Board to de-
termine for itself whether or not further proceedings are warranted, and to avoid need-
less dissipation of the Government's time, effort, and funds." 0. D. Jennings & Co., 68
N.L.R.B. 516, 518 (1946).
17. "When the preliminary inquiry which the Board makes discloses that the union's
interest is substantial, it is the practice of the Board to proceed with its representation
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proof could be challenged at the hearing, the selection of a labor represen-
tative might be delayed with a consequent obstruction of the bargaining
process. Furthermore, there would be disclosure of the employees' choice
of a representative prior to the election and the desired secret ballot would
be negated."8
A necessary factor in establishing adequate administration of elec-
tions is the elimination of spurious recognition requests on the employer.
If a union claims recognition from the employer, and the employer later
contracts with a second union, this contract will become a bar to an elec-
tion unless the first union has filed its petition within ten days of its
request. 9 This procedure not only renders harmless the unfounded re-
quests but also provides against an employer who wishes to contract with
a union other than the first one seeking recognition. If the first union
is diligent and files within ten days, the employer's attempt will be
unsuccessful.
The Board in the development of its policy regarding the effect of
pending unfair labor practice charges on an election must consider two
factors: the need for prompt elections and in an atmosphere conducive
to free choice. The NLRB has declared that it will not conduct a repre-
sentation election while unresolved charges are pending against the em-
ployer since such charges tend to create an atmosphere preventive of free
elections.2" However, to postpone the election until the charges have
been resolved will, in some cases, unduly delay the process of bargaining.
Thus, in cases where the circumstances warrant, the Board will allow the
union to waive the unfair labor practice charges as a basis for setting aside
the election and conduct an election while the charges are still pending.2'
Such a waiver will in no way effect the claims filed but will merely permit
a more prompt election. Even with this waiver, conditions are not con-
investigation without permitting formal challenge at the hearing to this preliminary de-
termination." NLRB v. J. I. Case Co., 201 F.2d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 1953) ; cf. Kearney &
Trecker Corp. v. NLRB, 209 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1953).
18. "But we agree with the Board that no statutory purpose would be served by
requiring formal proof at the hearing of the substantiality of the Union's claim to repre-
sentation or by permitting the contending parties to litigate such issues at the hearing.
Among other undesirable consequences, a trial of that nature would bring about disclosure
of the individual employees' desires . . . and would violate the long-established policy of
secrecy of the employees' choice in such matters." NLRB v. J. I. Case Co., supra note 17
at 600.
19. Grand Leader Dry Goods Co., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 183 (Sept. 18, 1953) ; General
Electric X-Ray Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 997 (1946).
20. "[T]he continuing effects of . . . unfair labor practices tend to vitiate em-
ployees' free choice . . . and, if it were feasible, we would never conduct an election
among employees of an employer charged with violaltion of the Act .... ." May De-
partment Stores Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 258, 275 n.35 (1945) ; cf. Edward J. Schlachter Meat
Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1952).
21. May Department Stores Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 258 (1945).
NOTES
ducive to free choice. The unfair labor charges should be allowed to be
waived only when an immediate election is necessary to attain the pur-
poses of the Act.22
Unfounded unfair labor practice charges might be filed by either
party for the purpose of delaying an election. In such cases the Board's
agents are instructed to dismiss them unless the charging party, within
seventy-two hours of the original filing, produces evidence to establish a
prima facie case. This administrative decision facilitates the bargaining
process by dispensing with unnecessary delays.23
The election may be of two types: consent 24 or Board ordered." In
the Board ordered election a hearing is held by the Regional Director to
determine if a question of representation exists, to establish the payroll
period for voter eligibility, to set the date, hour, and place of election, and
to determine the unit of employees that will be polled. The Director's
order is subject to review if prejudicial to either party. 6 In a consent
election the existence of a question of representation is determined in the
preliminary investigation,2 7 while the other elements are agreed upon by
the parties and the hearing is waived.
An employer does not have to agree to a consent election and it is not
necessary for him to give reasons for this refusal.2" However, the consent
election agreement is the most frequently used method of settling a
representation question. In the fiscal year 1953 approximately seventy
percent of all representation elections conducted by the Board were con-
sent elections.2 " There are two kinds of consent elections: agreement for
22. In cases where the employer has been found guilty of the charges and the
Board's order remains to be enforced by the court, the NLRB will again refuse an elec-
tion in the absence of a waiver. Ibid. A union is estopped from asserting unfair, labor
practices as a basis for setting aside an election if it should have petitioned with knowl-
edge that the employer may have engaged in unfair labor practices. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 238 (1949). The employer cannot have the Board dismiss
the union's recognition petition if the unfair labor charges were filed by another union.
Morrison Turning Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 687 (1949). Since the unfair labor charges had not
been filed by the union seeking the election, the employer could not rely on these charges
in order to gain a delay in the election.
23. 2 CCH LAB. LAW rEP. § 5540.24 (1954). This is a ruling of the NLRB
General Counsel.
24. See Section 9(c) of the Act; 29 CODE FED. REGS. § 102.54(a) (1949).
25. See Section 9(c) of the Act; 29 CODE FED. REGS. § 102.55 (1949).
26. Manchester Knitted Fashions, Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. No. 203 (June 18, 1954). If
the parties have not agreed to the time and place of the election, such determination is
left to the Regional Director. If the election facilities are inadequate, the election may
be invalidated. Gary Enterprises, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 431 (1949).
27. See note 15 supra.
28. There is no statutory enforcement of the consent election. It is a purely volun-
tary procedure entered into by the parties. See Tower, A Guide to NLRB Election Pro-
cedure, 25 PERSONNEL 55 (1948).
29. 18 NLRB ANN. REP. 103 (1953).
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consent and stipulation for certification upon consent."0 They differ only
with respect to post election procedure. In the former the Regional
Director rules on challenges and objections to the election and his deci-
sions are conclusive unless arbitrary and capricious"' while in the latter
all post election determinations are made by the Board. The consent
election with Board determination has been termed a compromise be-
tween the formal hearing procedure and the agreement for a consent
election. 2 The parties will more often agree to a consent election with
Board rather than with Regional Director determination because of the
more complete process of review, and, consequently, fewer hearings
will be necessitated.
The NLRB's role in a consent election consists merely of providing
an investigator to approve the agreement. Since the parties have agreed
to all the detailed mechanics of the election there is no need for a costly and
lengthy hearing. This marks a definite step forward in labor-manage-
ment relations in enabling the prompt settlement of many election dis-
putes. In the fiscal year 1953 the average time lapse in a consent election
from the time of filing the petition to the election was twenty-four days
compared to sixty-four days in cases of Board ordered elections. 4
30. Agreement for consent elections are provided for in 29 CODE FED. REGS. §
101.18(a) (1) (1949) ; the stipulation for certification upon consent election in 29 CODE
FED. REGS. § 101.18(b) (1949). Consent elections are held by agreement of all concerned.
31. NLRB v. Saxe-Glassman Shoe Corp., 201 F.2d 238, 240 (1st Cir. 1953). In a
case in which a run-off election was necessary following a consent election, it was not
considered arbitrary for the Regional Director to withdraw his approval of the consent
election where it appeared that an increase in employment might result in disenfranchise-
ment of the newly hired employees. Riviera Mines Co., 108 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (Mar. 30,
1954). It was also not arbitrary to allow the withdrawal of the union from a consent
election without invalidating subsequent proceedings if the election were held on an em-
ployer's petition. Henry L. Peirone, et al., d.b.a. Alloy Manufacturing Co., 107 N.L.R.B.
No. 257 (Feb. 19, 1954).
32. This was the view of Robert Volger, Officer in Charge, 35th Sub-Region, Na-
tional Labor Relations Board expressed in a communication to INDIANA LAW JOURNAL,
Oct. 25, 1954.
33. One writer indicates that: "With the stipulation, the Board rather than the re-
gional director rules on objections and challenges. Generally the same ruling would be
obtained from either source; there are some lawyers, however, who feel that in the past
regional directors have been more prone to find company interference than the Board
would have with the same facts." Tower, A Guide to NLRB Election Procedure, 25
PERSONNEL 55, 56 (1948).
In describing the stipulation consent election an NLRB official indicated: "Where
the parties agree to a [stipulation agreement] they are foregoing a formal hearing prior
to the election and are securing a . . . quick election, but . . . they receive complete and
full process of law . . . by the Board whether there is a formal hearing or not." Robert
Volger, Officer in Charge, 35th Sub-Region, National Labor Relations Board. (Com-
munication to INDIANA LAW JOURNAL, Oct. 25, 1954).
34. 18 NLRB ANN. REP. 2 (1953).
NOTES
Where the parties fail to agree on the voting unit, the Board is given
power to determine it for bargaining purposes.35 Similarity of interests
among the employees is of utmost importance in establishing these units.
Those employees with the same hours, wages, and conditions of employ-
ment are grouped together for their mutual benefit." Since wishes of
the employees are important in the establishing of units, the Board may
in its discretion delegate to the employees this determination." Thus,
when the factors involved in unit determination are in balance the Board
will place each unit on the ballot. If union "A" desires a plant wide unit
and union "B" smaller craft units, the employees of the craft will be given
an opportunity to express their preference.3"
The individual employee must be given a voice in the selection of the
representative, and it becomes imperative that voter eligibility be deter-
mined in a fair and reasonable manner. The franchise is limited to those
employed in the unit as indicated by the payroll period immediately pre-
ceding the date of the election order. This includes employees who are
not working during the period due to illness, vacation, or temporary lay
off. 9 It also includes employees on leave in the United States military
service who appear in person at the polls.4" After the eligibility period
and before the date of the election, employees who are permanently trans-
ferred out of the voting unit lose their vote, yet any employees who are
transferred into the unit do not gain the right to vote.4 Employees who
have either quit or have been discharged for cause and who have not been
35. Section 9(b) gives the Board power to determine the unit for election and bar-
gaining purposes.
36. Engineering Research Associates, Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 207 (1948).
37. "The Board's determination, [of the unit] based upon the expression of the
employees' . . . preference, cannot be said to be improper and invalid." NLRB v. Under-
wood Machinery Co., 179 F.2d 118, 121 (1st Cir. 1949) ; cf. NLRB v. Local 404, 205 F.2d
99, 103 (1st Cir. 1953).
These are called self determination or "Globe" elections and were originally allowed
for in Globe Machine & Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937).
38. A self determination election is usually held when one union seeks an industrial
unit that includes certain craft employees. The craft ballots are segregated to determine
if they want separate representation or inclusion in the larger unit. See Wheland Co.,
96 N.L.R.B. 662, 664 (1951) ; J. I. Case Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 692, 696 (1949).
Craft units in a highly integrated production process have the right to separate repre-
sentation even though the pattern of bargaining has been industrial. American Potash &
Chemical Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 290 (Mar. 1, 1954). This could result in loss of
efficient production due to the number of smaller bargaining units in which disputes
could arise.
Even in cases where the group of employees did not constitute an appropriate unit
and had not been represented they are given an opportunity to express a preference.
Zia Co., 108 N.L.R.B. No. 140 (May 27, 1954).
39. Whiting Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 117 (1952).
40. Atlantic Refining Co., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 226 (Oct. 20, 1953).
41. The Board has established a procedure for voter eligibility, and therefore denies
a vote to any employee who becomes a member of the unit after the date of eligibility.
9 NLRB ANN. REP. 29 (1944).
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reinstated prior to the date of the election are not eligible to vote.12  The
NLRB has also ruled that when the employment turnover of a specific
category of employees is so great as to indicate lack of interest, these
workers are not to be included in the voting unit.43 The Board has estab-
lished these standards to give voice to the greatest number of employees
with as little administrative action as possible.
It is specifically provided by the Act that an employee on strike and
not entitled to reinstatement is barred from voting.4" This section of the
Statute has been criticized as a weapon for union busting. Under the
Act an individual who participates in a strike continues to be an em-
ployee." However, a distinction is drawn between economic strikers,
who if permanently replaced are not entitled to reinstatement, 46 and un-
fair labor practices strikers. An economic striker is one who strikes due to
failure of negotiations and not because of unfair labor practices com-
mitted by the employer. Thus it appears that an employer could perma-
nently replace economic strikers, seek an election, and attempt to vote out
a union. This is justified only when there is an unwarranted economic
strike. It would appear that since the Act gives an employee a right to
strike, it should not upon the exercise of that privilege, deprive him of
a right to vote.
Frequently, a second union may seek to get on the ballot. The
Board has relaxed the requirements for participation of the intervenor,
42. Ibid.
43. In one case since the turnover of employees was 25% every thirty days and few
workers remained employed for more than three months the Board ruled that there was not
sufficient interest to include these employees as voters. Borden Co. (Dixie Dairies Divi-
sion), 102 N.L.R.B. 460 (1953).
44. Section 9(c) (3) of the Act states: "Employees on strike who are not entitled
to reinstatement shall not be eligible to vote."
45. Included in the definition of "employee" in section 2(3) is "... any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor
dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other
regular and substantially equivalent employment.
46. An economic striker is entitled to reinstatement upon unconditional application
unless they have been permanently replaced by the employer. NLRB v. Mackey Radio &
Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
47. The Board has stated: "Employees who engage in an economic strike retain
their status as employees during the course of the strike, absent some affirmative action
which severs that relationship. This severance may be accomplished by act of the em-
ployee himself, by securing permanent employment in another job, or may be accom-
plished by the employer through lawful discharge. . . . If this status as an employee
• . . has not been ended . . . by the date of the election, the individual is entitled to cast
a ballot...." Union Manufacturing Co., 101 N. L. R. B. 1028, 1029 (1952). See also
18 NLRB ANN. REr. 25 (1953) ; Harris, The Taft-Hartley Act: Amendments Suggested
by the C.I.O., 23 TENN. L. REV. 126 (1954) ; Petro, On Amending the Taft-Hartley Act,
4 LABOR L.J. 67 (1953).
NOTES
which need only show a recent contractual interest." The intervenor
lacking such an interest is not required to exhibit the full thirty percent
employee support asked of the original petitioner unless it seeks to repre-
sent a different unit from the one prescribed in the petition." As an
administrative practice the Board has required at least a ten percent show-
ing of employee support by the intervening union in Board ordered elec-
tions where no contractual interest is found. A lesser interest may
suffice in consent elections if the intervenor accepts all terms.5"
The amount of employee interest in a union is an administrative de-
termination. Thus when the Board has decided to hold an election it is
only just to allow another union with a reasonable interest a place on the
ballot. The employees are thus allowed a wider choice at the expense of
only one election. It may be difficult for more than one union to receive
thirty percent support due to employee indifference to unions, and it
appears unwise to exclude an intervenor because of this failing. How-
ever, the procedure could lead to abuse and the Board should not allow
a union a "free ride."
Pre-election Activity
Once the election has been ordered the parties will begin their cam-
paign. The Board does not attempt a physical surveillance of this pre-
election activity, but it does through its decisions indirectly police election
conduct by establishing standards of allowable electioneering. There is
a definite pattern in the NLRB's decisions invalidating elections. Broadly
stated any deprivation of an employees' freedom of selection will serve to
nullify an election and free choice is ruled impaired through that conduct
which amounts to coercion.
Implied threats by the employer of loss of employment or of certain
disadvantages should the union be victorious are coercive and will invali-
date an election."' Statements of opinion depicting what might result
from unionization are privileged so long as there is no indication the
48. See Krueger Sentry Gauge Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 420 (1952) ; Bethlehem Steel Co.,
97 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1952). A recent contractual interest means that the intervenor has
had a contract with the employer which has recently terminated.
49. "[A] labor organization seeking to intervene for the purpose of severing a craft
unit from an existing industrial unit or intervening for a smaller unit in a representation
case involving a larger unit, should make the substantial showing of interest which is
required of petitioners." Seaboard Machinery Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 537, 538 n.4 (1952).
50. 17 NLRB ANN. R P. 31 n.19 (1952). The Board did not specify what would
be considered an adequate interest showing in this situation.
51. The employees were threatened that the union would close the plant if it was
not victorious, Caroline Poultry Farms, Inc., 104 N.L.R.B. 255 (1953). Threats by a
supervisor to lay off employees invalidated the election. Worthington Corp., 106 N.L.R.B.
No. 133 (Aug. 19, 1953). Threats of loss of Christmas bonus invalidated the election.
Kent Plastic Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 51 (Nov. 24, 1953).
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employer will use his economic powers to make such prophecies come
true." Such a distinction is necessary to enable an employer to remind
employees of past union practices.
Coercion has been found where a benefit is granted or promised
just prior to an election, not pursuant to a predetermined schedule, and
where the relationship between the election and the benfits was not merely
a coincidence. Such conduct tends to mislead employees with thoughts
of benefits making them unmindful of other aspects of the election. How-
ever, the Board has held that the type of benefit-promise proscribed by
the Act does not include an announcement of the possibility that at some
indeterminate date the employer might arrive at a new wage earning
plan.5" Further, when a union has openly challenged an employer to give
a wage increase, and he does so, the union has no grounds for complaint."
The Board has declared that union promises of wage increases fall within
the allowable limits of pre-election propaganda.5 The union itself cannot
grant wage increases so its promises may be interpreted as merely a
promise to strive for these benefits if selected by the employees.
Threats of bodily harm and individual economic reprisal are clearly
coercive tactics." The mere fact that certain groups of employees may
be considered as sophisticated and accustomed to certain practices does
52. An employer wrote a letter to the employees depicting the previous conditions of
employment under the union. It was held to be permissible pre-election opinion. Morgan-
ton Full Fashioned Hosiery Co., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 312 (Mar. 11, 1954). But cf. Moksnes
Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 204 (Sept. 30, 1953). An employer's expressed preference
of competing unions unaccompanied by coercive statements or conduct does not consti-
tute interference. Heintz Mfg. Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 768 (1953).
An employer is permitted to state his opinion as to his legal position. Esquire Inc.,
107 N.L.R.B. No. 260 (Feb. 23, 1954). The employer indicated to the workers his belief
that an incorrect unit determination had been made and his only redress was to refuse to
bargain. The employer indicated that a number of years would be required for the court
to review the Board's order to bargain. The Board viewed this as a statement of the
employer's legal position.
53. Knickerbocker Mfg. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (Dec. 23, 1953). Here
the announcement of application to WSB for increased wages was ruled enough to in-
validate the election. See also Union Sulphur & Oil Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (July
24, 1953) ; United Screw & Bolt Corp., 91 N.L.R.B. 916 (1950).
54. The vagueness of the announcement eliminates an interpretation of benefit.
American Laundry Machinery Co., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 114 (Dec. 23, 1953). Benefits
which had previously been announced before the direction of an election will not in-
validate the election when re-announced just prior to it. Baird-Ward Printing Co., Inc.,
108 N.L.R.B. No. 114 (May 7, 1954).
55. Gong Bell Mfg. Co., 108 N.L.R.B. No. 181 (June 11, 1954).
56. Shirlington Supermarket, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (Aug. 7, 1953).
57. The Board found all of the events of the campaign were intended to intimidate
employees by threats of bodily harm in Bloomingdale Brothers, Inc., 87 N.L.R.B. 1326
(1949). A statement by a union official to a woman employee just before the election to
the effect that: "If you don't vote for the Union the girls will refuse to work with
you," was ruled to imply a threat of economic reprisal. G. H. Hess, Inc., 82 N.L.R.B.
463, 465 (1949).
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not neutralize a campaign characterized by threats of bodily harm.",
This type of campaign is so inherently coercive that the Board will not
even consider whether or not it was effective.59
Under certain circumstances the mere speaking of words which
would not otherwise amount to an unfair labor practice by employers and
labor organizations will result in NLRB invalidation of elections. The
Labor Management Relations Act makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to make a speech containing a ". . . threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit.""0 In General Shoe Corporation6 although
the Board found the language used by the employer not an unfair labor
practice, it set aside the election declaring that ". . . conduct that creates
an atmosphere which renders improbable a free choice will sometimes
warrant invalidating an election .... "6"
Generally, an employer who speaks on company time and premises
does not have to afford the union equal speaking time.63  Only the em-
58. Stern Brothers, 87 N.L.R.B. 16 (1949); accord, Bloomingdale Brothers, Inc.,
87 N.L.R.B. 1326 (1949).
59. Efforts by the employer to reassure employees of a free election will have no
effect on campaigns of sustained coercion. When a campaign becomes so coercive that
its effects upon the parties will not even be considered it is inherently coercive. Bloom-
ingdale Brothers, Inc., 87 N.L.R.B. 1326 (1949).
Such conduct should be compared with the continual interrogation of an individual
for a period of thirty-six hours by police officials which was involved in a Tennessee
case. The Court there said: "We think a situation such as that . . . is so inherently
coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable with the possession of mental free-
dom. . . ." Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944). (emphasis added).
60. Section 8(c) states: "The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or
the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this
subsection, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit."
61. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
62. Id. at 126. The Board added that: "In election proceedings, it is the Board's
function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under condi-
tions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees.
It is our duty to establish those conditions; it is also our duty to determine whether they
have been fulfilled. When . . . the standard drops too low . . . the requisite laboratory
conditions are not present and the experiment must be conducted over again." Id. at 127.
In this case the employer spoke to groups of employees in the company president's office.
63. Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (Dec. 17, 1953). This case has
overruled a long line of cases which attempted to reinstate the captive audience doctrine
that was repudiated by Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948).
In Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951) the employer, a department store,
had a broad no-solicitation rule which prohibited solicitation of workers both during
working and nonworking hours. Since the employer made a speech to employees on
company time and premises without granting the union's request for an equal opportunity,
the election was invalidated. This decision was expanded so that even in the absence of
a no-solicitation rule, if an employer spoke on company time and premises the election
would be set aside. Biltmore Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 905 (1951) ; Bernardin Bottle Cap
Company, 97 N.L.R.B. 1559 (1952); Belknap Hardware & Manufacturing Co., 98
N.L.R.B. 484 (1952); Foreman & Clark, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 40 (1952).
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ployer who prohibits union solicitation at all times on company premises
must grant the union spokesmen an equal opportunity to express their
views. 4 It thus appears necessary to allow unions in some way an equal
opportunity with employers to disseminate election material. This Board
decision assures the employees a chance to hear both sides of the contro-
versy enabling them to make an enlightened choice.
Since last minute talks by either employer or union on company time
tend to interfere with free choice, the Board prohibits all speeches to cap-
tive audiences given twenty-four hours prior to an election.65 This rule
has been criticized as not serving to restrain the union's activities since
the site of the union's last minute speeches would rarely be the employer's
premises during company time. The employer, on the other hand, is ef-
fectively limited since he would not customarily communicate with em-
ployees away from the plant.66 This contention has some merit but the
rule is desirable since it tends to foster the much desired election atmos-
phere. The employees are election conscious, and the free choice election
can be more easily achieved if they are not confronted with partisan
declarations immediately prior to an election in the confines of the
company premises and on company time.
Formerly, employer's conduct in calling employees into his office in-
dividually and delivering an anti-union speech would result in summary
invalidation of an election if the management were successful in"defeating
The court ruling on the Board's decision in Bonwit Teller declared it was too broadly
drawn. Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952). But subsequently
the Board ignored the Court's decision and declared this type employer speech an unfair
labor practice in Metropolitan Auto Parts, Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 1634 (1953). From the
line of cases that evolved from the Board's Bonwit Teller decision, a doctrine much
divorced from the original rule came into effect and has now been repudiated by the
Board.
64. "We rule therefore that, in the absence of either an unlawful broad no-solicita-
tion rule (prohibiting union to company premises on other than working time) or a
privileged no-solicitation rule (broad, but not unlawful because of the character of the
business), an employer does not commit an unfair labor practice if he makes a pre-
election speech on company time and premises to his employees and denies the union's
request for an opportunity to reply." Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (Dec.
17, 1953).
An employer should not be allowed completely to prohibit unions from its premises
and still engage in speech activities during working hours. However, the employer should
be under no duty to provide working time speech opportunities to a union so long as the
union is allowed to communicate with employees during the nonworking hours on com-
pany premises.
65. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (Dec. 17, 1953).
66. See Rose, Is the NLRB Tampering With Freedom of SpeechV, 15 U. OF PITT.
L. REv. 462 (1954). See also Texas City Chemicals, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. No. 13 (July 9,
1954).
The twenty-four hour rule was held not limited to working days. Sylvania Electric
Products, Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. No. 182 (June 10, 1954); General Motors Corp., 108
N.L.R.B. No. 165 (June 7, 1954). An informal meeting does not come under the rule.
National Petro-Chemicals Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 330 (Mar. 16, 1954).
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the union.6" The wrong was in the method rather than the remark.
Presently, this employer conduct is viewed in respect to the atmosphere
in which the interrogation occurred. Questioning of employees as to
union affiliation or union activities no longer automatically invalidates
an election for if such interrogation does not effect free choice, it is
permissible. 8 The impact on employee choice can best be determined by
an intelligent appraisal of all the events, and a consideration of the sur-
rounding circumstances may actually establish the coercive character of
seemingly unobjectionable conduct. This recently adopted procedure in
interrogation cases"9 would seem an improvement over the former rule
since it is wiser to look to the totality of the conduct to determine its
ultimate effect.7"
False propaganda has been held allowable by the NLRB so long as
it can be recognized as propaganda.71 It is when such propaganda results
in coercion or confusion that the harm results. If the employee, as any
67. Lakeshore Motors, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 89 (1952); General Shoe Corporation,
97 N.L.R.B. 499 (1951).
68. One court has indicated that: "... the time, the place, the personnel involved,
the information sought, and the employer's conceded preference, all must be considered
in determining whether or not the actual or likely effect of the interrogations upon the
employees constitutes interference, restraint or coercion." NLRB v. Syracuse Color Press,
Inc., 209 F.2d 596, 599 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 966 (1954).
The Board has declared ". . . the test is whether, under all the circumstances, the
interrogation reasonably tends to restrain or interfere with the employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed by the act." Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. No. 85 (July
30, 1954).
69. NLRB v. Syracuse Color Press, Inc., supra note 68; Blue Flash Express, Inc.,
supra note 68.
70. One court appears to have considered the totality of conduct where it states,
. the Board itself has established the principle that an election can serve its true
purposes only if the surrounding conditions enable employees to register a free . . .
choice . . . and . . . when a record reveals conduct so glaring that it is almost certain
to have impaired employees' freedom of choice, the election should be set aside." NLRB
v. Trinity Steel Co., 214 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1954).
In this case the employer had informed employees of a request for a wage increase.
The union erroneously denied that the employer had made such request. The NLRB
would not set aside the election because it considered that the employer had ample op-
portunity to reply to union claims. Since the employer had not learned of the mis-
representation until after the election, the court ruled that the Board had erred. It was
necessary to look to the chain of events leading up to the misrepresentation of the union
and consider all factors relating to the employer's announcement of wage increases. See
also Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. NLRB, 210 F.2d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 1954); Liberal
Market, Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. No. 220 (June 25, 1954). The Board found in one case that
two letters sent to employees by the employer when viewed together would invalidate the
election even though when viewed separately they would not constitute interference.
Boston Mutual Life Insurance Co., 110 N.L.R.B. No. 36 (Oct. 7, 1954).
71. International Smelting & Refining Co., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 16 (Nov. 10, 1953);
Unity Manufacturing Co., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 10 (Nov. 10, 1953); Radio Corp. of
America (RCA-Victor Division), 106 N.L.R.B. No. 251 (Nov. 2, 1953); Merck &
Company, Inc., 104 N.L.R.B. 891 (1953). False statements which could not be recog-
nized as propaganda will not invalidate an election if they are too remote in time from
the election. Krambo Food Stores, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 742 (1952).
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reasonable employee,"2 is unable to recognize something as propaganda
and is thus unable to evaluate it, he may be confused and hindered in mak-
ing his choice. In this connection, sample ballots used for electioneering
and bearing the name of the Board's official representative will invalidate
an election. 3 It is the Board's policy to void an election where employees
may have been misled by an implication of governmental endorsement
of any one choice. 4
The Board has declared that it will not, in the absence of violence,
censor pre-election campaign propaganda, but it will set aside an election
if the conduct is coercive and so timed as to effect the voting." In one
case the management assisted a group of employees who had written an
anti-union letter by allowing them the use of his mailing facilities to send
the letter to the other workers. The employer had edited the letter which
was signed by one of the employees. Since the employer had concealed
his part in the operation he created the misleading impression that this was
a spontaneous employee response while actually it was a company anti-
union campaign. The election was set aside because the coercive con-
duct ". . . misrepresented to the employees the source of this anti-union
propaganda, thereby infringing their right to a fair opportunity to
evaluate it." 6
The NLRB election notice provides for a no-electioneering area to
further the attainment of free employee choice. Distribution of handbills
outside the area during an election will not result in it being set aside.77
But when a union passed out handbills in the area, was asked to move but
remained, the election was invalidated."
72. "An evenhanded application of an objective test is the best protection against
arbitrary administrative action." Liberal Market, Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. No. 220 (June 25,
1954).
73. L. Gordon & Son, Inc., 100 N.L.R.B. 438 (1952); Gray Drug Stores, Inc., 95
N.L.R.B. 171 (1951).
74. "No participant in a Board election should be permitted to suggest to the voters
that this Government agency, or any of its officials, endorses a particular choice. That
was the plain implication of including the Director's name and title directly under a
recommendation as to how voters should vote." The Am-O-Krome Company, 92 N.L.R.B.
893, 894 (1950).
75. Maywood Hosiery Mills, Inc., 64 N.L.R.B. 146 (1945).
76. The Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 790, 792 (1952). See Stewart-
Warner Corporation, 102 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1953).
77. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 94 N.L.R.B. 640 (1951).
78. Southwestern Electric Service Co. v. NLRB, 194 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Con-
tinental Can Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 785 (1948). There is no rule against electioneering prior
to the time of the election. South Bend White Swan Laundry, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 217
(Oct. 12, 1953); Emerson Electric Co., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (July 14, 1953). Mere
presence of a union official near the voting area will not invalidate an election. Darling
Retail Shops Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 464 (1953). Actions by strangers to the election will
not invalidate an election unless there is evidence that the parties ascribed to the conduct.
Clarke Mills, 109 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (Aug. 3, 1954) ; Poinsett Lumber & Mfg. Co., 107
NOTES
When a sound truck is used during an election two factors are criti-
cal: whether the broadcast is electioneering" and the immediacy of the
broadcaster's voice to the voters."0 When the broadcast of electioneering
material can be heard in the voting area the employee may be distracted
during the voting and hindered in selecting a representative. This use of
a sound truck may be held a violation of the twenty-four hour restriction
if the electioneering reaches the employees at the employer's plant on
company time within the twenty-four hour period. 1
In certain cases the Board should be allowed discretion to invalidate
an election in which the actions of the parties indicate lack of responsibility.
Conduct that is so reprehensible that it manifests an unworthiness of
those parties involved to represent employees must not be allowed during
the election campaign. Reproof of these activities amounts to a policing
of campaigns since other parties profit by mistakes invalidating elections.
In one election a false telegram which tended to discredit a rival union
and which bore the forged signature of the president of that union was
distributed to the employees. The real ground for the Board's invalida-
tion of the election seems to have been a recognition that such conduct
would detract from the dignity of the election process. 2
Condluct of Elections
The Board takes every precaution to create the proper election atmos-
phere. A few days prior to the election a notice is prominently displayed
informing the employees of the election and their voting rights.8 " An
N.L.R.B. No. 64 (Nov. 27, 1953); Diamond State Poultry Co., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 19
(Nov. 9, 1953).
79. Southern Fruit Distributors, Inc., 104 N.L.R.B. 261 (1953). In this case the
union had announced by loudspeaker that it would return on Monday following the elec-
tion to solicit membership and that all were invited to come over to the sound truck and
await the final election returns. The Board declared that such an announcement does
not constitute electioneering. Id. at 262. Use of sound truck for mere announcements
or playing of music is not electioneering.
80. When a union broadcasts electioneering material during the voting hours from
a sound truck the actual distance of the sound truck from the voters is immaterial. Hig-
gins, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 145 (Aug. 21, 1953); Alliance Ware, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 55
(1950).
81. Recently the Board refused to set aside an election in which a sound truck was
used within the twenty-four hour restricted time because the employees were subjected to
the electioneering as they left the plant and were thus not on company time. Repcal
Brass Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (Oct. 4, 1954); Underwood Corp., 108 N.L.R.B.
No. 199 (June 18, 1954).
82. United Aircraft Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 102 (1953). The Board appeared to place
the decision on the existence of deliberate deception as to the telegram's source thus
hindering the employee's evaluation of it as propaganda. Actually the Board went beyond
that in applying its corrective authority. Id. at 105.
83. The election notice informs an employee of his right to choose a representative
as well as his right to refrain from such activities. It outlines the purpose of the elec-
tion and that it will be conducted by a secret ballot. The notice also outlines the voting
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employee cannot make a free choice unless he is adequately appraised of
the alternatives and his rights.
The voters and election observers must be made to realize the serious-
ness of the election, 4 the outcome of which will affect each employee in
his daily work and living habits. Instructions are given each election
observer which specify certain duties and tend to impress upon him a
sense of responsibility in assisting to conduct an impartial election where
each eligible voter can freely make his selection in secret.8" Because an
employee can be greatly influenced by an observer's conduct, each organi-
zation86 should make a conscious effort to appoint observers whose
qualifications are above reproach.
Election agents are representatives of the NLRB." It is their duty
to conduct fair elections, eliminate confusion at the voting booths, and
establish conditions for secret balloting. The agent supervises the ob-
servers who assist him in all phases of the election. The agent and the
observer together check the eligibility of each voter. If there are no
irregularities in identification, the agent gives the voter a ballot" and
assigns him to a booth. If a voter's eligibility is challenged, his vote is
put in a separate sealed envelope which is then placed within a large en-
velope on which is written information relative to the challenge. This
is deposited in the ballot box. The challenged ballot will be passed on only
if it becomes necessary in order to determine the results of the election.
procedure and displays a copy of the official ballot. See National Labor Relations
Board Notice of Election, Form No. NLRB 707 (5-51).
84. "[T] he basic problem is to hold the election observers and voters to the business
of the moment .... ." Robert Volger, Officer in Charge, 35th Sub-Region, National
Labor Relations Board in a Communication to INDIANA LAW JOURNAL, October 4, 1954.
85. The Board distributes instructions to the observers which specify their duties in
detail. See National Labor Relations Board Instructions to Election Obesrvers, Form
No. NLRB 722 (4-27-48) for these instructions.
86. "An employer does not have an absolute right to appoint observers in a Board
conducted election. Board Rules permit parties to be represented at an election by ob-
servers of their own selection, but subject to such limitations as the Regional Director
may prescribe. It is established Board policy that supervisors may not act as observers
for an employer." Burrows & Sanborn, Inc., 84 N.L.R.B. 304, 305 (1949).
87. "Our elections are conducted by Field Examiners who are regular full time
employees of the various Regional offices. (In rare instances, such as particularly large
elections, temporary employees are occasionally hired to assist the regular regional office
staff.) . . . The NLRB Manual, available only for agency use, is a guide to field per-
sonnel in elections as well as other procedural aspects of the agencies' work. The in-
dividual Board Agent is guided by this manual, the statute, and by decisional principles.
These rules are basically the same regardless of the type of industry and/or union."
Robert Volger, Officer in Charge, 35th Sub-Region, National Labor Relations Board.
(Communication to INDIANA LAW JOURNAL. October 4, 1954).
88. The ballot used is a standard- form and supplied by the Board. When only one
union seeks recognition, the ballot contains a place for an affirmative or negative vote.
If there is more than one union, the choice is one of the unions or no union. See 1 CCH
LAD. LAW REP. 1111 210, 1211, 2725.80 (1954).
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If the challenged vote is valid it is taken from the large envelope and com-
mingled with other ballots so as to maintain the secrecy of the vote.89
If the agent must give assistance to a voter, it should be done in the
presence of an observer from each party. The agent also has the duty
of ascertaining that the ballot boxes are empty prior to voting and of
sealing them in the presence of the observers after completion of voting.
It is important that the agent be highly skilled in his dealings with the
voters, for he too is instrumental in achieving proper election conditions.9"
As in all secret elections, it is necessary to establish some standard
for ruling on mutilated ballots. Though previously an erasure auto-
matically mutilated the ballot,9 now so long as the intention of the voter
can be determined with reasonable certainty, such a ballot will not be
voided.9 2 Every ballot with a reasonably clear indication of the voter's
intent should be counted to determine the true wishes of the employees.
The elections are based on majority rule. The majority rule re-
quirement has undergone three distinct phases." Presently, to have a
conclusive election there must be a designation by a majority of the em-
ployees who participated in the election. At the same time, the voters
must constitute a substantial number of all eligible employees although
they may be less than a majority.9" The question then becomes: What
is a substantial number of eligible voters? The basic test is that the
number of voters must be representative of those eligible.9" One factor
in determining the representative character of an election is the ratio of
the total vote cast to the eligible employees. Emphasis should also be
placed on whether or not the employees had adequate notice of the election
and an opportunity to participate.9" The presumption is that employees
89. It would seem that the ballot would not be secret if only one voter was chal-
lenged and his vote was necessary to break the tie vote. However, in all other instances
the secrecy of the ballot would be maintained.
Any challenge to voter eligibility must occur prior to the time the ballot is deposited
in the ballot box. This maintains the secret ballot for otherwise undue attacks on voter
eligibility may be attempted. NLRB v. A. J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324 (1946).
90. For a full discussion see National Labor Relations Board Instructions to Elec-
tion Agents, Form No. NLRB 721 (5-1-45).
91. Whitinsville Spinning Ring Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 801 (1951).
92. NLRB v. Whitinsville Spinning Ring Co., 199 F.2d 585 (1st Cir. 1952) ; Crowell
Carton Co., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (Sept. 29, 1953); Denver & Ephrata Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 182 (Sept. 17, 1953).
93. The statute was originally interpreted to mean designation by a majority of
eligible voters. A minority not voting could defeat the election. Chrysler Corp., 1
N.L.R.B. 164 (1936). Later a majority of eligible voters had to participate with a ma-
jority of these voters desiring representation. Associated Press, 1 N.L.R.B. 686 (1936).
The present rule is discussed in the text.
94. R.C.A. Mfg. Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 159 (1936).
95. NLRB v. Central Dispensary & Emergency Hospital, 145 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir.
1944), cert. denied 324 U.S. 847 (1945).
96. Ibid.
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who did not vote have acquiesced in the choice designated by the voting
majority.9" It would seem unreasonable to declare that the process of
collective bargaining should be delayed simply because a majority of
eligible voters neglected to vote.98 The purpose of the election-to select
a bargaining representative through peaceful means-would have been
attained and should bind all fully apprised of their rights.
The automatic99 run-off election is necessary when no one selection
receives a majority of the votes.' The ballot in a run-off election in-
cludes the two choices receiving the highest number of votes.1"' In any
labor election the voters must determine if they desire representation, and
if so, by whom.' When there are three choices on the ballot (union A,
union B, and no-union) a question arises as to whether the no-union
selection should be allowed on the run-off ballot if it receives less votes
than union A, more than union B, but less than the combined total of the
two unions? This has been answered affirmatively.' It might be
argued that this method gives an advantage to the non-union minority at
the expense of the divided majority who voted for a representative. How-
ever, the Board's solution gives ample opportunity for voters to choose
between union organization or no-union.
The NLRB has established specific rules and regulations for voter
eligibility in run-off elections."'0  Only employees eligible in the original
election and still employed in the unit at the date of the run-off election
are eligible to vote.0 5 The NLRB deviates from this rule only when
there is a substantial increase in employment in the original unit. A new
eligibility list will then be established.'
97. NLRB v. Standard Lime & Stone Co., 149 F.2d 435 (4th Cir. 1945).
98. Ibid.
99. The automatic run-off election is provided for in Section 9(c) (3) which states:
"In an election where none of the choices on the ballot receives a majority, a run-off
shall be conducted. . . ." See 29 CODE FED. REGS. § 102.62 (Cum. Supp. 1954).
100. "[A run-off] election eliminates the possibility that an insignificant minority of
employees, which happen to hold the balance between two or more competing organiza-
tions, can indefinitely forestall the selection of a collective bargaining agent." Coos Bay
Lumber Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 476, 478 (1939).
101. Section 9(c)(3) states: "[The run-off ballot provides] for a selection be-
tween the two choices receiving the largest and second largest number of valid votes cast
in the election."
102. MILLIS AND BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 520 (1950).
103. See note 100 supra; W. Shanhouse Sons, Inc., 100 N.L.R.B. 604 (1952).
104. 29 CODE FED. REGS. § 102.62 (Cum. Supp. 1954).
105. Ibid. See Standard Coil Products Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 261 (1952). An employer
discharged prior to the date of the run-off election is not eligible to vote in that election.
Cone Mills Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 159 (Jan. 14, 1954).
106. When there was a thirty-six percent increase in the unit, the eligibility list for
the run-off election was revised in order not to disfranchise a substantial number of
employees. United Aircraft Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 878 (1953).
When there is considerable delay between the original election and the run-off so
NOTES
When two unions equally divide the eligible votes the Board does
not direct a run-off election." 7 Such an election would be futile since
the vote would probably be the same unless a number of eligible employees
had failed to vote. If the latter is the case a run-off election will be
conducted.'
Once an election has resulted in a valid determination of the em-
ployee choice for representative the stage is set for collective bargaining
since one union assumes the responsibility exclusively to represent the
employees and the employer is under a duty to recognize that union. The
proper atmosphere for the bargaining procedure is dependent upon the
union being free from interference from others seeking representation
for a definite period. Following statutory authority, the NLRB has
long declared that a union certification becomes a one year bar to any
representation determination in that voting unit.0 9 This tends to achieve
the requisite stability."0
The Board's function in conducting labor representative elections is
to attain as nearly as possible free choice for employees. It can directly
supervise the actual voting process through its agents and the election
observers. The total campaign activity and conduct can only be super-
vised through the Board's decisions. To attempt otherwise would be an
impossible task. The Board's program is calculated to produce an ade-
quately informed and interested electorate which is the greatest assurance
of an intelligent selection and ultimately of successful collective bargaining.
that substantial turnover of employees becomes inevitable, a new eligibility list is neces-
sitated to assure a representative vote.
107. "In the event two or more choices receive the same number of ballots and an-
other choice receives no ballots and there are no challenged ballots that would affect the
results of the election, and if all eligible voters have cast valid ballots, there shall be no
run-off election. . . ." 29 CODE FED. REGS. § 102.62(d) (Cum. Supp. 1954).
This situation would arise infrequently since it depends upon all eligible voters par-
ticipating. This would only preclude an election until the parties had petitioned for an-
other election and started the election machinery again.
108. Ibid.
109. Section 9(c) (3) states: "No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit
or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election
shall have been held." See Ludlow Typograph Co., 108 N.L.R.B. No. 209 (June 25,
1954); Coastal Drydock & Repair Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 194 (Jan. 29, 1954).
110. The Board has ruled that it will grant a union's request to withdraw from a
run-off election only on the condition that no petition for a new election be filed for one
year. See United States Steel Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 213 (Oct. 9, 1953). This is
certainly a reasonable limitation, and it tends to enforce the integrity of the election
process.
